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Despite a common legal framework for electronic
signatures within the European Union, qualified
electronic signatures have not been a market
success, although several governments are
issuing or plan to issue signature capable
identity cards to all their citizens. However, the
high market penetration of smart cards does not
necessarily lead to an increased number of
signature transactions. To tap the potential for
electronic signatures, there is a need for
applications that are used on a frequent basis. In
this paper, a method is proposed to achieve
single sign on by using qualified electronic
signatures. This solution can be used for all e-
commerce sites, regardless of whether they
accept or use electronic signatures.
Introduction
The EC Directive on electronic signatures sets out a
framework of requirements for electronic signatures.1
The Directive distinguishes between “electronic
signatures” and “advanced electronic signatures”. An
advanced electronic signature is defined in article 2(2)
as an electronic signature that meets the following
requirements:
”(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can
maintain under his sole control; and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a
manner that any subsequent change of the data is
detectable;”
Certification service providers (CSP) can issue
certificates for advanced signatures that will be
qualified if they meet the requirements of Annex I of the
directive. Those advanced signatures with qualified
certificates will be referred to in this article as qualified
signatures.
The market share of EC-directive conforming signature
cards is disappointingly low, failing to meet
expectations, perhaps with the exception of electronic
identity cards issued by governments.2 It can be argued
that the lack of customers prevent companies from
investing in signature products, which in turn implies
there is almost no commercial reason for using qualified
electronic signatures, and consequently potential
customers do not seek to obtain signature products.3
However, qualified electronic signatures offer the
potential to transfer e-government processes from
paper to electronic medium, and possibly to save tax
payers’ money.4 But these potential savings can only be
realized if a large proportion of the population has, and
more importantly, uses qualified electronic signatures.
Several governments are presently issuing5 or plan to
issue6 identity cards with electronic signatures to all
their citizens. The goal of these initiatives is to increase
the penetration rate of smart cards with electronic
signatures within the population.
However, the presence and availability of an
innovation does not necessarily lead to a high adoption
rate within the population.7 One example is the German
“Geldkarte”. This smart card enables the user to make
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small electronic payments, and is included on most
German EuroCheque cards. Despite over 60 million
cards already distributed in Germany, only 38 million
transactions were made in 2004 (0.63 transactions per
user per year).8 Therefore, a high penetration rate of
signature cards will not automatically lead to the
adoption of qualified electronic signatures, especially if
costs and benefits are not fairly distributed, and prices
remain as high as they are.9 In addition, the network for
qualified electronic signatures does not increase with
the distribution of signature cards but with the adoption
of the signature functionality. So by simply distributing
signature cards the critical mass will not automatically
be obtained.10
Potential savings can only be accomplished if
qualified electronic signatures are widely used.
Furthermore, frequent usage of the system will help the
users remember the Personal Identification Number
(PIN) that is usually used to authenticate the user.11
Limiting the length of a PIN will make it easier to
remember the number. Therefore, in order to create an
incentive for users to adopt applications with qualified
electronic signatures, the application needs to generate
a relative advantage12 or increase perceived usefulness.13
E-government applications will not be sufficient to
create this kind of incentive, because they do not occur
frequently enough. For example, according to Fox,14 the
average citizen in Germany is only required to deal with
the public administration 2.1 times a year.
Authentication issues
Strong password dilemma
One of the biggest problems users are confronted with
when interacting with current authentication systems, is
choosing a strong password.15 In the web environment,
users need to have a number of passwords for a range
of different uses. Examples are web based mail, e-
commerce sites and discussion forums. Passwords are
also widely used for authentication in e-mail, operating
system login, remote shells, databases and instant
messaging. This leads to a large number of passwords
that a user has to generate, memorize, and remember.
However, remembering a number of randomly selected,
independent passwords is a strain, especially if a
password is used only occasionally. Therefore, users
tend to either choose weak passwords, or choose
related passwords for several or even all accounts.16
Also, users tend to write down their passwords,
especially in the case of randomly generated
passwords.17 
Humans are able to remember short passwords and
passwords that they can easily associate with
something. It has been shown that users tend to choose
weak passwords if the system allows it.18 User defined
passwords are often based on words from natural
language; typical examples include family members or
hobbies. However, such practices undermine the
security of the authentication system. This can be
exploited in dictionary attacks; an attacker just has to
check a list of commonly used passwords. Sometimes,
users have to change their passwords periodically, and
may not reuse old passwords. The problems is that
humans do not have a capacity for retaining arbitrary
passwords, especially if they are required to remember
a number of them. Forgotten passwords are a major
problem, and resetting them are a cost to the
organization. One study estimated that help desk staff
have to reset user passwords manually in 82 per cent of
cases.19 This procedure will often take more than five
minutes. As forgotten passwords are among the most
common problems encountered by IT departments, this
may result in high help desk costs. Additionally, the
distraction and the time spent on resetting the
password will reduce the productivity of users.
Current solutions
While it might be difficult to manage a large number of
strong passwords, remembering only one strong
password may possible, even for an occasional user.
The term single sign on (SSO) describes a system that
allows a user to authenticate themselves to a number of
services using one master password. A significant
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advantage is that it limits the number of passwords that
need to be used. The master password will also
generally be used quite frequently, which helps to recall
the password. However, such a password must not be
easy to guess. It should also be closely guarded, as it
will enable an attacker to obtain access to all services of
the user.
There are quite different approaches to implement
single sign on. Several systems that provide secure and
usable user authentication are described below.
Encrypted password lists
One of the most trivial and widely employed solutions
for the password management challenge is to save user
passwords to a file. There are several applications that
offer the possibility to save users’ service passwords in
a file that is stored on the user’s hard drive. One open
source example is Schneier’s Password Safe
application.20   The feature is also included in most
modern browsers. Examples are Opera (The Wand),
Internet Explorer (AutoComplete) or Firefox (Password
Manager). The password list is encrypted using a key
that is derived from a master password. This method
offers a reasonable level of security. However, it has
several drawbacks. If the stored data is lost, users are
unlikely to recall the stored passwords, as the master
password is the only authentication information they
have to remember regularly. Therefore, the user is
unable to recover any of his service passwords without
help from the service provider. In addition, the password
file has to be present on any machine from which
services are to be obtained. As it is sensitive, albeit
encrypted, information, this can be quite cumbersome.
Tokens
An alternative to password based authentication is the
use of tokens. In contrast to passwords, where the
authentication process is based on something the user
knows, token authentication utilizes something the user
has. One example of such a token is a smart card. It
usually stores keys for a public key infrastructure (PKI)
or other cryptographic application, and is able to
perform the relevant algorithms. Because of the
physical nature of tokens, it is harder for an attacker to
acquire it without the user noticing the theft. An
attacker might steal a token, clone it, and then return it
to the user. This would require considerable technical
skills and an additional interaction with the victim,
though.
However, a user might lose his token. This will lock
the user out of the system, and can probably only be
fixed with help from an administrator, and will incur the
costs of buying a new token. Additionally, a token might
be acquired by an attacker, which would grant them
access to the protected services. Tokens are therefore
often combined with additional forms of authentication
to minimize the security risk of loss.
Smart cards may be used as a secure place to store
encrypted password lists. In combination with a secure
password generator, this allows for secure, two factor
authentication. There are a number of products and
similar implementations that store encrypted passwords
and other authentication information on a smart card or
similar token. The user authenticates to the card using a
PIN, unlocking the data. While a token based
authentication works well in closed user groups, it is not
suitable for authenticating at various e-commerce
websites from different vendors. No e-commerce vendor
would be willing to issue expensive hardware tokens to
its customers or, even more unlikely, potential
customers.
Centralized SSO systems
In addition to client side or token based password
storage mechanisms, a number of SSO solutions use
authentication servers run by a trusted third party to
authenticate a user to service sites. In such a system,
the user authenticates to a trusted server, which in turn
identifies the user to the service requested, using a mix
of personal information that the user has stored on the
server, and the authentication token that is recognized
by the services. Also, most SSO Systems in use require
that specific protocols be used at the server side. This
leads to increased implementation costs, and also
carries the risk of vendor lock-in, as implementing
another protocol on top of an existing service may prove
quite a challenge.
Furthermore, centralized systems require strong trust
towards the SSO service provider, as potentially
valuable data, for example credit card information,
might be stored on the server side. Additionally, the
SSO service might claim to be the user without the
user’s authorization. As most organizations do not enjoy
this level of trust, a single sign on solution that does not
require a third party seems preferable. Also, even if an
organization seems trustworthy initially, this trust may
well be undermined by security breaches or
weaknesses, or even by a simple shift in users’
perception of the company.
20 Schneier, B. “Password Safe,”
http://www.schneier.com/passsafe.html.
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Therefore, from a user perspective, the usefulness of
these systems is quite limited. On the other hand, such
systems are very dependent upon acceptance among
the various service providers, as they are normally not
able to communicate with authentication mechanisms
that use another protocol. Also, it seems unlikely that
all service providers would uniformly trust the central
authentication authority.
Identity Federations
However, there certainly are partners that an
organization would trust for the purpose of
authenticating users. These partners would not be the
same from organization to organization, but one could
expect clusters of companies that are held together by
mutual trust. Some examples of such protocols and
standards are the Liberty Alliances set of protocols21
and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML).22
However, such identity federation protocols still require
modifications on the service side. Additionally, there are
several federation standards in the market, so the
actual benefits of investments in a specific technology
are often unclear.
PKI 
Public key infrastructures provide secure
communication using asymmetric cryptography. In
addition to simple token based systems that offer only
authentication, they enable users to create digital
signatures. Using digital signatures enable users to
authenticate themselves and sign transactions,
ensuring the integrity of their messages. Furthermore,
certificates that are issued by a third party are used as
proof of authenticity as well as assurance of certain
attributes of the users. Like password files, the private
keys are usually stored on the user’s hard disk or a
smart card, and encrypted using a password.
However, the establishment and operation of a PKI
requires large investments.23 E-commerce vendors
might be willing to accept PKI as an additional method
for authentication. However, they will not be willing to
build and maintain a PKI of their own. It is not surprising
that PKIs have not achieved a large market penetration.
Furthermore, like SSO systems, PKI is usually not able
to authenticate the user to competing authentication
protocols. The system’s usefulness is also dependent of
the acceptance on the server side.
However, if a global PKI is already in place, such as,
for example in Belgium,24 using such an existing
infrastructure for e-commerce authentication is a logical
step. The problem then is to encourage the e-commerce
vendor to accept this kind of authentication. Since this
will require investment by the e-commerce vendor, it is
unlikely to happen unless the group of potential
customers, demanding this form of authentication, is
large enough to justify the investment. While waiting for
e-commerce vendors to accept digital signatures might
be viable in the long run, a different approach that is not
dependent on the vendors’ cooperation might be more
promising.
Integrating qualified electronic signatures
and password legacy systems
Naturally, a single sign on solution that is usable ‘out of
the box’ with already deployed signature cards is highly
desirable from the perspective of the user. Such a
solution offers additional security for the central
authentication secret. It provides two-factor
authentication, using a token and a PIN. To enable the
system to be deployed easily in association with an
existing signature card infrastructure, it is preferable to
only use algorithms that are used during the signature
processes and are present on all smart cards that can
produce digital signatures. This eliminates the
possibility of storing the service passwords on the
smart card, since freely accessible memory may not be
present on all cards, and if present, it may already have
been allocated for other uses.25 One possibility is to use
the signature card to encrypt password lists for external
storage. This will have the same drawbacks as
encrypted password lists, which have already been
discussed above.
Generation of passwords using Smartcard
functions
Apart from storing passwords in an encrypted form, it is
also possible to generate them on the fly, using strong
cryptography. However, such methods have to
guarantee several security properties. The generated
passwords should be pseudorandom and independent.
To summarize the key property in a more concise way:
the generated service passwords must not be capable
21 W. Duserick, P. Madsen, S. Silk, L. B. M. Mathan,
N. Karhuluoma, S. Adachi, E. Norlin, L. Elliott, K.
Murphy, T. Candia, P. Cole and S. Deadman,
“Whitepaper on Liberty Protocol and Identity
Theft,” Whitepaper, Liberty Alliance, 2004
www.projectliberty.org/resources/whitepapers/Lib
erty_Identity_Theft_Whitepaper.pdf.
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open.org/specs/index.php#samlv2.0.
23 J. Lopez, R. Opplinger and G. Pernul, "Why Have
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Research, (15:5), October 2005, pp 544 – 556.
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of being forged, even giving service passwords for
another service. This implies that no information about
the central secret is leaked.
The basic architecture of this approach can be
summarized in four steps:
1. Define a scheme for deriving service identifiers for
the different service providers the user might want to
authenticate to. This can be implemented by
concatenating several attributes of the service, such
as a service name, URL, the user’s login, and so on.
Data for the service identifier may be provided by the
user, or automatically loaded from the target
application. Such functionality might be provided by
a browser plug-in in the e-commerce case, or by a
service integrated in the operating system to allow
for support of a broader range of target applications.
2. Combine the identifier for the service with the user’s
master password using strong cryptography.
3. Transform the resulting value into a pseudorandom
account password. This can be done using a simple
Base64 encoding, although more complicated
schemes may be used to ensure the compliance of
passwords with service policies.26
4. Transfer the password to the appropriate service
login form. This may be realized by an application
that integrates with current browsers, such as a plug-
in.27 Other implementations that generate passwords
for additional services, such as database access or
remote login are also possible.
Several cryptographic primitives, such as hash
functions and signatures, are suitable for step 2. The
details of the different implementations will be
described in the following sections.
Hash Functions
A possible implementation of such a password
generation scheme using hash functions was patented
by Abadi and others in 1997.28 Recently there has been
renewed interest for this method in the context of web
single sign on and phishing protection, and several
papers have been published describing different
implementations.29 Service identifier and master
password are combined, for example concatenated, and
then hashed, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Diagram of the password creation process using
hash functions 30
The result is unique for each account, due to the
collision resistance of hash functions. It should also be
impossible to compute the master password from it,
because of the one-way property of the hash function.
This scheme could be implemented using a smart
card to do the hashing. However, this does not provide
any additional security, as the hash function does not
utilize any data stored on the smart card. Additionally,
the user has to authenticate twice. He first has to
provide his PIN to the smart card, and then provide the
master password for the password generation scheme.
Of course, this is quite cumbersome and contrary to the
notion of single sign on. To make matters worse, hash
functions do not provide clear security guarantees when
some of the information about the inputs may already
be known to the attacker or attaining part of the input is
sufficient to mount an efficient attack. In the presented
single sign on application, an attacker can probably
determine at least part of the service identifier for any
given service, and will benefit greatly if he can
determine a part of the master password as well, which
might be chosen in a way that knowing part of it makes
guessing the whole password quite easy.
26 Blake Ross, Collin Jackson, Nick Miyake, Dan
Boneh, John C Mitchell, “Stronger Password
Authentication Using Browser Extensions,”
Proceedings of the 14th Usenix Security
Symposium, 2005,
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec05/tech/ross.
html.
27 J. A. Halderman, B. Waters and E. W. Felten, “A
convenient method for securely managing
passwords,” WWW '05: Proceedings of the 14th
international conference on World Wide Web,
2005, pp 471-479
http://www2005.org/cdrom/contents.htm.
28 M. Abadi, K. Bharat and J. Marais, “System and
method for generating unique passwords,” 1997,
US Patent #6141760
http://www.cs.auc.dk/~luca/PA-WG/resume-wg-
abadi.pdf.
29 See references at footnotes 36 and 37.
30 M. Abadi, K. Bharat and J. Marais, “System and
method for generating unique passwords,” 1997,
US Patent #6141760.
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Digital signatures
Like hash functions, digital signatures can be used to
generate strong service passwords for the user. Unlike
hash functions, digital signatures cannot be forged,
meaning that an attacker cannot produce the user’s
signature for any text if they do not have the secret key,
even if the attacker has obtained the user’s public key
and several examples of signed messages. The aim is to
translate this guarantee to passwords: an attacker
should not be able to compute any of the user’s
passwords without knowing the secret key stored on
the smartcard, even if the attacker knows the user’s
passwords for several other accounts. Towards this end,
the general password generation procedure structure
outlined above is commended, using digital signatures
for the combination step.
To illustrate the process, the following section will
give a description of an application of this technique to
a web surfing scenario. The whole process is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Password generation using smart cards
When the user needs to authenticate to an e-
commerce site (1-3), the local system first derives the
service identifier from the available context information
(4) e.g., a browser plug-in reads out the URL of the
target site and the contents of the login name field. The
user authenticates to the smart card using the PIN, thus
unlocking the private signature key (5). The service
identifier for the relevant account is then signed by the
signature card using the private key, producing a digital
signature (6). The resulting value is encoded as a
password (7) and transmitted to the service provider
requiring authentication, along with the user’s login
name (8). The user is then permitted to gain access to
the protected resources (9).
One advantage of this approach is that the central
secret – the user’s private key - is actually stored on the
smart card and not directly dependent upon a password
chosen by the user. Guessing the PIN will only allow
access to this key if the attacker is also in possession of
the token (or a cloned version of it). Furthermore, the
passwords derived from the signature links the user’s
identity to using the service. The signature, encoded as
a password, may be verified by the service provider
using the user’s public key. To accomplish this, the
service provider first decodes the password to the
original signature, and then follows the usual
verification procedure.
Obviously, this is only
possible if reversible
encoding schemes are
used. Of course,
signatures in this
scenario are not
linked to individual
transactions. This is
due to the fact that
the widely deployed
password systems do
not perform user
authentication on a
transaction level.
Discussion
Comparison to current single
sign on solutions 
Compared to the conventional
approaches presented in the previous
section, the proposed solution offers several
advantages. In contrast to conventional smart
card solutions that store encrypted passwords on
the token, this proposal can be deployed on top of an
already existing signature card infrastructure, thus
limiting costs for the user and also the amount of
authentication tokens the user has to manage. The card
is portable but it is – in many cases, for example where
signature cards are deployed as part of e-government
initiatives - not obvious that it is used as a SSO token,
so the security risks of portability are partially
mitigated. Using the SSO system does not require trust
towards any third parties, as opposed to systems based
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on an authentication proxy or similar architecture. The
authentication secret is only handled by the user and
the service, with the central authentication secret
remaining on the user side – more specifically, on the
token - at all times.
Additionally, this system does not require a specific
interface on the server side. This saves implementation
costs for the service provider in comparison to a
standardized SSO system or a PKI. The system may
even work together with services that are completely
unaware of its existence. It allows for the use of a
simple password mechanism on the service side, which
should keep implementation costs and reduce the
barriers for new users at a minimum level. The system
offers an alternative to hash functions for the purpose
of generating passwords on the fly. In addition to the
capabilities of hash function based systems, the
implementation takes full advantage of the strengths of
smart card based two-factor authentication. The
portability and convenience of this solution can be
further enhanced by using mobile qualified electronic
signatures.31
Contribution to the adoption of qualified
electronic signatures
It is proposed that an application can be made for
qualified electronic signatures that enables citizens to
authenticate themselves at all e-commerce websites,
regardless of whether these websites accept or use
electronic signatures. Therefore, the usage of qualified
electronic signatures is no longer dependent on the
cooperation and acceptance of e-commerce vendors.
Since the proposed solution can be used with any web
site that requires authentication, it has the potential to
be used frequently. It uses infrastructure deployed by
some European countries and offers several advantages
compared to current single sign on solutions.
The user can employ the solution for password
management, which is an everyday task. This in turn
might ameliorate the acceptance of digital signatures,
leading to a wider usage of signature cards and readers
and to a more secure, multi-factor authentication
infrastructure. However, it will probably not be the
“killer application” for digital signatures. Users have to
understand the benefit of generating strong passwords.
This is further complicated by the tendency of users to
believe that negative events are less likely to happen to
them than to others, and that positive events are more
likely to happen to them than others.32 On the other
hand, users are frustrated by the challenge of managing
vast numbers of passwords and will probably also
appreciate the additional protection of the central
secret.
Conclusion
This article proposes a method that allows qualified
electronic signatures to be used with password
authentication systems without any modification at the
service side. This might help to break the deadlock
between missing applications and digital signatures. It
is an application for an infrastructure that is already
deployed, and that can be used frequently by the card
owners. Therefore, the number of transactions based on
digital signatures might increase, and citizens can
become familiar with signature cards, which could
speed up the diffusion of digital signatures, unlocking
the potential to transfer e-government processes from
paper to electronic medium.
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